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Rethinking inequality in the 21st century – inequality and household balance sheet 
composition in financialized economies 
Dr Hanna Karolina Szymborska* 
Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of household wealth heterogeneity on inequality and macroeconomic 
stability in financialized economies. Based on the case of the USA since the 1980s it argues that transformation 
of financial sector operations has generated inequality by influencing gains from wealth ownership and leverage 
levels across the income distribution. Securitization and the subprime lending expansion have led to the 
emergence of a new class of leveraged homeowners, experiencing large increases in wealth prior to the Great 
Recession, followed by substantial losses after the crisis. Simultaneously, capitalists have diversified their asset 
portfolios while earning the highest and fastest growing wages in the economy when employed as financial 
sector executives. In this light, the paper proposes a new conceptualization of households in macroeconomic 
models, defined by balance sheet composition rather than income sources alone. To inform this taxonomy, 
inequality and leverage indicators are simulated in a stock-flow consistent model calibrated to US data with 
three classes of households distinguished by their wealth composition, and a securitized financial sector. The 
proposed framework is found to produce more empirically accurate levels of income inequality and greater 
macroeconomic instability than the two-class division, and establishes an equalizing effect of housing for wealth 
distribution.  
Keywords: Household wealth, Inequality, Macroeconomic modelling, Financial system, USA 
JEL Classifications: C63, D31, E44 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of household wealth heterogeneity on inequality 
and macroeconomic stability in the USA since the 1980s. It is argued that financial sector 
transformation has contributed to inequality by making household balance sheets more 
complex in the process of financial deregulation, financial innovation, securitization, and 
broader liberalization and privatization policies in the US economy over the past five 
decades. The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that heterogeneity of 
household wealth structures across the distribution of income is an independent distributional 
channel in financialized economies. The findings of this paper show that consideration of the 
increasing complexity of household wealth contributes to our understanding how income and 
wealth distribution influence economic stability in times of financialization. The paper also 
contributes to the stock-flow consistent modelling literature by proposing a new 
conceptualization of the household sector in this framework.    
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The interplay between the micro-level structures of household wealth and macroeconomic 
institutions related to financial sector transformation has been manifest in the subprime 
homeownership bubble in the USA in the 2000s. The process of securitization has 
contributed to rising capital income flows among low- and middle-income families, while the 
expansion of subprime lending raised household indebtedness. Simultaneously, high-income 
individuals, typically identified in the Post Keynesian literature as capitalists, have benefited 
from high and rapidly growing earnings when employed as top managers in the financial 
sector, contributing to greater wage inequality. These processes have increased the 
complexity of household balance sheet composition across the distribution of income, pulling 
top managers, financial executives, and owners of diversified wealth portfolios towards the 
top of the income distribution, while simultaneously pushing low- and middle-income 
households into unsustainable indebtedness.  
Greater household balance sheet complexity poses a challenge for the Post Keynesian 
macroeconomic modelling literature because it puts into question the suitability of the 
conventional dichotomous division of households into workers and capitalists in 
understanding the determinants of inequality and macroeconomic stability. Recent 
developments in the inequality literature have accounted for aggregate wealth disparities to 
explain the causes of inequality and its consequences for macroeconomic dynamics (Piketty, 
2014). This paper attempts to integrate these insights into the Post Keynesian framework, 
arguing that the role of balance sheet heterogeneity across the distribution of income has not 
been explicitly explored by the existing Post Keynesian literature on inequality and 
macroeconomic stability.  
To fill this gap in the literature, a stock-flow consistent model is developed incorporating 
three classes of households distinguished by their balance sheet composition and a complex 
financial sector. The model is calibrated to the US data. The model contributes to the Post 
Keynesian financialization literature by simultaneously considering the complexity of 
household wealth structures and the diversity of income flows among low- and middle-
income households, as well as indebtedness and rising wage inequality at the top of the 
distribution. The analysis reveals that the proposed taxonomy of households according to 
wealth composition rather than income sources alone produces empirically accurate patterns 
of inequality, leading to higher income inequality and macroeconomic fragility. The findings 
of this paper highlight the importance of explicitly considering the disparities in household 
balance sheet structures in macroeconomic processes. The proposed model also formally 
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shows within the SFCM that homeownership has an equalizing influence on the distribution 
of household wealth.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 identifies key institutional mechanisms of the 
transformation of the US financial sector since the 1980s and documents their influence on 
household balance sheet disparities. Section 3 reviews how these disparities have been 
incorporated in the existing macroeconomic theories of inequality. Section 4 outlines the 
proposed three-class conceptualization of households based on wealth structures, 
emphasizing its importance for explaining rising inequality and macroeconomic stability in 
times of financial sector transformation. Sections 5 and 6 examines the ability of this 
framework to reproduce the observed patterns of wealth and income inequality in the USA 
and compares it to the dichotomous division of households into workers and capitalists using 
simulation analysis based on a stock-flow consistent model. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The transformation of household wealth and rising inequality, 1989-2013  
The explicit focus on the composition of household wealth in this study is motivated by the 
increased ownership of wealth towards the bottom of the income distribution in the course of 
subprime lending expansion and securitization. Although the distributions of income and 
wealth are related, as those with high income tend to hold high wealth, income reflects 
current living conditions, while wealth provides an additional insight into their past levels (if 
savings are seen as excess income over consumption) and future possibilities (by determining 
capacity for investment in education and the quality of life; Cowell et al., 2012, p.1). Recent 
literature emphasizes that wealth distribution is more important for the overall structure of 
inequality in the 21st century than it was in the post-war era, and that differences in saving 
and consumption propensities are not enough to predict inequality levels in advanced 
countries (Piketty and Zucman, 2014). 
In the USA, wealth inequality has been persistently higher than income inequality, and these 
two measures followed divergent trends in the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession. 
Data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (U.S. SCF) indicates that the Gini index of 
pre-tax income1 increased from 0.521 in the 1989 wave of the survey 0.598 in the 2016 wave, 
 
1 The U.S. SCF measures household income before transfers and taxes for the calendar year prior to the survey 
wave, and accounts for wage income, business income, interest and dividend income, realized capital gains, 
social security and retirement income, and income from social transfers. 
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and that the Gini index for net wealth rose from 0.828 to 0.877 in this period (Wolff 2017)2,3. 
But while the Gini index for income fell from 0.574 to 0.549 between the 2007 and the 2010 
waves of the survey, the Gini coefficient for net wealth continued to rise, increasing from 
0.834 in 2007 to 0.866 in 2010.  
Increasing wealth and income inequality in the USA since the 1980s have been underpinned 
by institutional changes in the US economy (Fitoussi and Stiglitz, 2009; Guttmann and 
Plihon, 2010; Karacimen, 2013). Since the 1980s, growth of real average earnings has been 
sluggish, which has been linked to the introduction of labor market liberalization policies, 
shareholder value maximization in corporations leading to greater preference for short term 
financial profits over long-term productive investment, as well as rising costs of healthcare, 
education, and housing following privatization of public services (see Dos Santos, 2009). 
Financial positions of low- and middle-income households have become increasingly 
unsustainable as debt has come to serve as a substitute for falling real incomes (Barba and 
Pivetti, 2009). 
Moreover, rising inequality has been influenced by financial sector transformation. 
Specifically, securitization was a major part of this process, underpinned by gradual financial 
deregulation and motivation to identify alternative sources of revenue among financial 
intermediaries in a new “originate-to-distribute” banking model (Dymski, 2009; Dymski et 
al., 2013). The 1999 Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act was instrumental in these developments: By 
allowing commercial banks’ involvement in investment banking activities, it facilitated the 
rise of unregulated shadow banks and led to the expansion of the mortgage-backed securities 
market, which was fueled in large part by subprime mortgages and payday loans (ibid.). By 
2006, mortgage-backed securities accounted for nearly 60% of total mortgage debt 
outstanding (Rosen, 2007), while over 80% of subprime and Alt-A loans were securitized 
(Baily et al., 2008). The rise of structured finance based on proliferation of subprime 
mortgages generated an unequal hierarchy of monetary claims, which boosted asset values 
and income flows for households at the top of the income distribution at the cost of increasing 
financial fragility for low- and middle-income families (Szymborska, 2019). According to 
 
2 Note that estimates of income inequality using data from the U.S. SCF tend to be higher than other estimates 
as the dataset oversamples households at the top of the distribution. For instance, estimates based on data from 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey yield the Gini index for pre-tax 
household at 0.431 in 1989, rising to 0.463 in 2007 and 0.476 in 2013 (U.S. Census Bureau 2019). 
3 Note that the estimates of the Gini index of net wealth in Wolff (2017) exclude the value of vehicles owned by 
a household on the grounds that the resale value of a vehicle does not accurately reflect its consumption value to 
the household (Wolff, 2017, p.6). 
5 
 
 
available evidence, the share of capital income going to the individuals in the top 10% and 
the top 1% of the income distribution began rising in the mid-1990s, reaching over 50% and 
70% respectively in 2015 (Robbins, 2018). 
The processes of financial sector transformation have influenced inequality by increasing the 
complexity of household balance sheets across the distribution of income and by generating 
stark disparities in the returns to assets and leverage across the households. Households at the 
top of the income distribution experienced systematically higher returns between 1983 and 
2007 than low-income households, and they have also experienced smaller losses in their 
returns to wealth after the Great Recession (Wolff, 2014, p.34). Financial deregulation and 
innovation boosted capital incomes of the rich through access to profitable wealth 
management services, financial securities markets, purchases of corporate shares, and 
accumulation of secured debt, all of which require large initial downpayments (Foster and 
Holleman, 2010; Galbraith, 2012). Simultaneously, low-to-middle-income households 
became locked into leveraged homeownership or had insufficient income to accumulate 
assets at all, while their demand for credit to finance expenditure increased. Rising demand 
for securitized products among financial investors incentivized predatory lending practices to 
subprime borrowers, as financial innovation and deregulation measures eased credit 
constraints for lower income groups, women, and people of color (Goda and Lysandrou, 
2013; Young, 2010). 
Figure 1 compares the composition of asset and debt holdings4 between households in the 
bottom quintile, the 20th to the 90th percentile, and the top decile of the income distribution 
between 1989 and 2013. Around 80% of the asset portfolio of households in the bottom 
income quintile was accounted for by low-yielding assets, including vehicles5 and other non-
financial assets, primary residence, and transaction accounts. Debt holdings of these 
 
4 In the U.S. SCF assets are defined as follows: Primary residence is measured as the reported market value. 
Business equity is measured in net terms. Transaction accounts include call, checking, and saving accounts, 
money market deposit accounts, and money market mutual funds. Financial investment assets include 
certificates of deposits, savings bonds, bonds, stocks, other managed assets, pooled investment funds, i.e. non-
money market mutual funds, and other financial assets. Retirement and insurance assets include the Individual 
Retirement Accounts, Keogh accounts, 401(k), and other retirement accounts, as well as the cash value of life 
insurance plans. Liabilities are measured as follows: Secured debt is measured as the amount outstanding on 
mortgages and home equity lines of credit secured by primary residence and other property. Unsecured debt is 
defined as credit card balances and instalment loans (which include vehicle, student, and consumer loans). Other 
debt is defined as other unsecured lines of credit and other miscellaneous forms of debt (e.g. debt to family 
members, borrowing against insurance policies or pension accounts, margin debt, etc.). 
5 As the objective of Figure 1 is to examine the breakdown of household asset and debt holdings at different 
points of the income distribution, vehicles are included in this figure as they constitute a substantial portion of 
the value of net wealth for households in the bottom income quintile. 
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households consisted primarily of unsecured instalment and credit card debt, although the 
contribution of mortgages secured by principal residence to total debt holdings of this group 
increased over time. 
Moreover, asset portfolios of households in the 20th to the 90th percentile of the income 
distribution relied heavily on primary residence, which contributed over 40% to total assets of 
these households between 1989 and 2013, with the share peaking before the 2007 crisis. 
Retirement and insurance assets accounted for the largest part of financial asset holdings of 
this group, rising over time. Debt accumulated by households in the 20th-90th percentile 
comprised mainly debt secured by primary residence, and the contribution of this type of debt 
rose over time, even throughout the crisis (that is, between 2007 and 2010). 
In contrast, asset holdings of households in the top income decile were more diversified, with 
financial assets, particularly retirement and insurance assets and high-yielding financial 
investment assets, contributing 44% to the overall asset holdings of the top income decile in 
2013, up from 34% in 1989. The contribution of business equity and other residence to total 
assets was substantial compared to the other income groups, accounting for around a fifth of 
the total portfolio of households in the top income decile. In addition, debt holdings of these 
households were dominated by debt secured by primary residence and other real estate.  
[Figure 1 here] 
The uneven accumulation of household debt constitutes another channel through which 
financial sector transformation has contributed to increasing inequality. Household debt to 
GDP ratio nearly doubled from 49% in the first quarter of 1980 to 98% in the first quarter of 
2008, stabilizing at 80% in the second quarter of 2016 (Federal Reserve Economic Data St. 
Louis Fed, 2017). Households in the bottom two income quintiles experienced the most rapid 
increases in indebtedness. Between 1989 and 2013, debt ownership rates increased from 47% 
to 52% for households in the bottom 20% of income distribution and from 60% to 67% for 
those in the 20th to 40th income percentile (U.S. SCF 2016). Simultaneously, the conditional 
median value of debt held by households in the bottom 20% of the income distribution nearly 
quadrupled in this period, rising in real terms from $3,172 in 1989 to $11,134 in 2013 
(figures in 2016 prices; ibid.). The increase was also substantial for households in the second 
income quintile, for whom the conditional median value of debt rose from $9,329 in 1989 to 
$21,653 in 2013. Nevertheless, it was households in the top income decile who recorded the 
highest debt levels, with debt ownership rate at 85% in 2013 (falling from 88% in 1989) and 
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the conditional median value of $278,398 in 2013 (rising in real terms from $138,074 in 
1989; ibid.). 
The composition of debt holdings presented in Figure 1 above matters for the conditions of 
loan repayment and household relative indebtedness. Between 1998 and the second quarter of 
2017, 30-year fixed mortgage rate averaged 5% compared to the average of 7% for the 
interest rate for a 48-month new car loan and 13% for the rate for credit card debt (Federal 
Reserve Data, G.19 release, 2017; Federal Reserve Economic Data St. Louis Fed, 2017). 
Relatively high contribution of unsecured debt to debt holdings of low- and middle-income 
households has contributed to these households’ financial fragility before and in the aftermath 
of the 2007 crisis. According to Figure 2 below, households in the 20th-90th percentile had the 
highest debt-to-asset and debt-service-to-income ratios between 1989 and 2013. Households 
in the bottom 20% of the income distribution experienced rapid growth in their debt-to-
income ratio and the debt-to-asset ratio, particularly in the run up to and immediately after the 
Great Recession (compared to a decline in the debt-to-asset ratio between 2010 and 2013 for 
the other income groups). By comparison, the increase in leverage was substantially lower for 
households in the top 10% of the income distribution, although these households experienced 
the highest levels of the debt-to-income ratio. This is expected given the higher value of 
assets held at the top of the distribution, which serve as collateral and allow for accumulation 
of greater debt levels relative to income. 
[Figure 2 here]  
In sum, the period of financial sector transformation since the 1980s has led to a greater 
balance sheet complexity and indebtedness of households across the income distribution. 
Divergent trends in capital income and earnings have contributed to unequal capacities to 
accumulate wealth for different households. Owing partly to the large share of primary 
residence, low-yielding assets, and unsecured debt, balance sheets of middle-income and low-
income households have become increasingly leveraged and volatile to property price 
movements and financial shocks. Conversely, greater contribution of profitable business 
equity, financial assets, and secured debt to wealth holdings of the richest households has 
been associated with higher annual rates of return. These dynamics have been directly related 
to the political economy of securitization and household indebtedness outlined above. 
Consequently, a powerful case for the impact of financial sector transformation on inequality 
emerges from the disparities of wealth holdings and leverage across households. 
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3. Revisiting the economic theories of inequality 
Despite its profound impact on the patterns of income and wealth inequality in the USA since 
the 1980s, heterogeneity of wealth structures across the income distribution has received 
insufficient attention in modern approaches explaining inequality6. Economic theory which 
puts the largest emphasis on the importance of wealth for inequality is found in Piketty 
(2014). In this view, inequality is driven by an interconnectedness between the aggregate 
levels of income and wealth. Accumulation of higher returns to wealth relative to the growth 
of income raises the capital share of income and increases inequality. However, while 
Piketty’s insight regarding the distributional impact of the interplay between income and 
wealth is pertinent in times of financial sector transformation, the theory does not explicitly 
discuss the role of these institutional changes (Szymborska, 2017). Several institutional 
causes behind rising income concentration have been identified elsewhere in the literature, 
focusing on financial liberalization (Galbraith, 2012), globalization and decreasing 
unionization (Rodrick, 1997; Kristal, 2010; Bengtsson, 2014; Stockhammer, 2017), and rent 
seeking behavior (Stiglitz, 2012). 
The link between household heterogeneity and financial sector transformation has been 
explicitly examined by the Post Keynesian functional income distribution literature. This 
theory distinguishes between profit-earning capitalists and wage-dependent workers7. 
Financialization8 is seen to increase the capitalist share of income through maximization of 
 
6 Neoclassical theory states that income inequality is a natural outcome of market processes as it reflects the 
marginal contributions to production, rewarding those with high or scarce skills (Stiglitz, 2012, p.37). Skill-
biased technological change, differences in human capital, and trade openness are seen as the key determinants 
of inequality (Galbraith, 2016, p.74). This approach has been criticized for ignoring structural and institutional 
factors generating inequality in modern advanced economies, which are outlined in the previous section. 
7 A distinction can be made between capitalists as entrepreneurs, who realize variable profit income dependent 
on the difference between expected and actual investment, and more passive rentiers, who receive fixed income 
in the form of unproductive rents based on their ownership of companies and financial institutions (Hayes, 2006; 
Toporowski, 2015). In the context of financial sector transformation and the existence of derivative trading, the 
capitalist class can be analyzed as including both entrepreneurs and rentiers, who pursue capital returns through 
investing in financial markets and ownership of financial assets (Toporowski, 2001). 
8 In this paper, we focus exclusively on changes in financial sector operations (primarily the development of 
structured finance and subprime lending) and their impact on the economy occurring since the 20th century, and 
avoid the term financialization to avoid its ambiguity (see definition by Epstein, 2005). This is because the 
processes of financialization related to the development of credit, money, financial instruments, and interest 
rates have been argued to take place for as many as 5,000 years (Graeber, 2011; Sawyer, 2013). Consequently, 
financialization is not limited to any particular time or place, can take a variety of forms, and at times may also 
go in reverse (Sawyer, 2017). For this reason, the preferred term used in this paper is financial sector 
transformation, which refers to the processes of financial liberalization and deepening in the USA since the 
second half of the 20th century. Financial deepening refers to increasing provision of financial services, 
diversity of financial instruments, and a greater number of financial institutions (Shaw, 1973). 
9 
 
 
shareholder value (see Hein, 2012; Palley, 2012, 2013). The distributive consequences of 
financialization have been analyzed in this literature using the stock-flow consistent 
modelling (SFCM) framework. Most SFCM studies are based on the dichotomous division of 
the household sector into workers and capitalists/rentiers, and focus on simulating the 
determinants of the functional distribution of income, particularly the wage share. 
While the functional income distribution literature often assumes that workers don’t 
accumulate wealth (Kalecki, 1954, 1971), several recent contributions in the SFCM literature 
include elements of household wealth in analyzing growth and macroeconomic stability 
(Zezza, 2008; Setterfield and Kim, 2013; Caverzasi and Godin, 2015; Nikolaidi, 2015; 
Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2015; Sawyer and Passarella Veronese, 2017; Detzer 2018). 
Most commonly, aspects of wealth distribution are included by allowing for borrowing by 
workers. Based on the endogenous money theory (Palley, 2002; Michell, 2016; Fontana and 
Sawyer 2016, 2017), these loans and the corresponding debt repayments are transferred from 
“debtor” workers to “creditor” capitalists in the form of financial assets. Wealth of rentiers is 
usually divided into firm equities and bank deposits. In addition, in Zezza (2008) capitalists 
receive income from homeownership through renting houses to some of the workers. 
Furthermore, Nikolaidi (2015) and Sawyer and Passarella Veronese (2017) incorporate 
securitization into the SFCM framework, assuming that the shadow banking sector increases 
the capital income inflows of rentiers. Moreover, Caverzasi and Godin (2015), Setterfield and 
Kim (2013), Kapeller and Schuetz (2014, 2015) and Detzer (2018) account for emulation of 
rentier consumption by workers.  
However, these SFCM analyses have not explicitly captured the role of differences in 
household balance sheet structures owing to financial sector transformation in explaining 
inequality. With the exception of Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2015), most of the studies 
reviewed above do not endogenously model the indices of personal income and wealth 
distribution. Moreover, few of these studies account for wage earnings among the top income 
group, or consider differences in household portfolio decisions in macroeconomic dynamics. 
This arises because of the dominance of the dichotomous division of households in these 
models, which does not sufficiently encompass the rising heterogeneity of wealth structures 
along the distribution. Furthermore, apart from Sawyer and Passarella Veronese (2017) 
borrowing is restricted to workers. However, as in the previous section, in the USA it is the 
rich who hold the largest amounts of debt, which calls for a distinction of various debt 
accumulation motives across the distribution.  
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In sum, greater complexity of household balance sheets resulting from financial sector 
transformation poses a series of challenges for the macroeconomic analyses of inequality. 
Existing theories tend to focus on aggregate categories and neglect the heterogeneity of 
income flows and wealth holdings among different households. Income heterogeneity is to a 
certain extent considered by the Post Keynesian functional distribution literature, but what 
this approach has not yet done is to examine how financial sector transformation has made 
the dichotomous division of households into workers and capitalists more complex. Given 
this gap in the literature, the paper proposes a framework complementing the functional 
distribution approach with Piketty’s emphasis on the interplay between income and wealth. 
This framework analyses endogenous determination of personal income and wealth 
inequality, accounting for household wealth heterogeneity and financial sector complexity. 
This is achieved by introducing a three-class view of households, including the middle class 
defined by its balance sheet structure dependent on leveraged housing. The household sector 
is thus redefined according to the differences in asset ownership, debt accumulation motives, 
and leverage levels rather than the type of income received.  
 
4. New conceptualization of households  
To incorporate the increased wealth heterogeneity of workers and capitalists in the macro-
modelling literature the household sector is defined based on differences in the balance sheet 
composition rather than their wage/profit shares. These differences are related to the 
securitization processes and various wealth accumulation motives. The paper models three 
classes of households, introducing a new group identified with the new class of leveraged 
homeowners formed in the subprime lending boom9. Based on the earlier analysis of 
household balance sheet structures, the three household groups are identified with the 
working class, the middle class, and the rentier class10. This approach links insights of Piketty 
(2014) and the functional distribution approach, highlighting the interplay between wealth 
ownership and income flows for overall inequality. The usefulness of the three-class 
distinction is the ability to identify different motives for asset and debt accumulation across 
households and to present a more intricate analysis of the points of financial fragility in the 
 
9 At this stage it is not endogenously explained why households in each group chose to rent or own their house. 
10 As shown in Table A2, it is assumed that working class households account for 40% of all households in the 
model, while the middle class and rentier households account for 50% and 10% of the modelled population 
respectively. This assumption implies that the homeownership rate in the model is 60% (corresponding to the 
sum of the population size of the middle class and rentiers), which is consistent with the empirically estimated 
value of 63.7% in 2016 based on the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. 
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economy. It is assumed that the population in each household group expands at the same 
exogenously given population growth rate of 0.7% (see Table A1 in the Appendix).  
4.1. Working class: “the working poor” 
The working class is identified with households whose balance sheets are dominated by low-
yielding assets and high leverage levels. It is assumed that these households do not carry 
enough wealth or income that would allow them to take out mortgages. Hence, all working 
class households rent houses from rentiers. Consequently, credit to the working class is 
assumed to consists of unsecured short-term consumer credit and payday loans. This is 
particularly relevant in the recent years as unsecured debt and payday borrowing have been 
on the rise after the 2007 crisis (The Pew Charitable Trust, 2012). This household group can 
thereby classified as the “working poor”. 
Real disposable income of the working class consists of wage income (𝜔ww1DLwm) and 
interest earned on deposits (rcbMw,-1), less interest paid on loans (rw,-1Lw,-1) and house rental 
payments (R) to rentiers (equation 1). Gross income of the working class is defined as wages 
and interest on deposits without considering loan repayments and housing rent payments 
(equation 2). Wage income of this group depends on the demand for labor performed by the 
working poor and the middle class (DLwm in equation 1) and the wage rate w1. It is also 
determined by an exogenously determined parameter 𝜔w, which corresponds to the share of 
the wage bill paid by firms to the working class and the middle class (w1DLwm) going to 
either group. It is assumed that the working poor earn 40% of this wage bill, with the rest 
accruing to the middle class.  
Rental payments on housing are defined in equation 4. They are determined by the value of 
houses owned by rentiers (Hr), adjusted by parameter 𝛾 and the debt-service-to-income ratio 
of rentiers (DSYr). The rationale for including the latter variable stems from the assumption 
that rentiers would attempt to compensate for any increases in their debt repayments relative 
to income by raising the amount charged on rent to the working class. Parameter 𝛾 depends 
on how fast the rentiers’ demand for housing expands compared to the growth of the housing 
stock supplied by firms (H), adjusted by an exogenously determined parameter h0 (equation 
5). It implies that if rentiers’ demand for houses grows at a faster rate than the available 
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supply of houses, rent payments charged to the working class will increase to compensate for 
the upward pressures on the price of housing11. 
Working class households consume an exogenously determined proportion c1 of their gross 
income less rent payments and an exogenously determined share c2 of their net wealth 
(equation 3)12.  It is assumed that working class households honor rent payments before 
making other consumption decisions to ensure that they have sufficient means to afford rent 
and minimize the risk of eviction13. The propensity to consume out of wealth is assumed to 
be the highest for this group compared to other households. Income remaining after 
consumption, rent payments, and loan repayments is saved as bank deposits (equation 6) 
We assume that the working class takes on debt to finance consumption (which is why the 
consumption function includes income before debt repayments). Assuming simple adaptive 
expectations14, borrowing by the working class is determined by their past consumption level, 
adjusted by parameter βw, and depends on the repayment rate of loans in the previous period 
(equation 7). βw captures household borrowing norms as well as lending norms in the 
financial sector (Setterfield and Kim, 2013, p.10). It is assumed that βw for the working class 
is lower compared to the other households. In this way, we are able to indirectly account for 
the borrowing constraints of workers, reflecting commercial banks’ attitude towards the 
creditworthiness of borrowers15. Net wealth of the working class is accumulated entirely in 
deposits less loans (equation 8).  
Three measures of leverage are included to account for different aspects of households’ 
financial fragility. Firstly, the debt-to-asset ratio is provided (equation 9), capturing the value 
of loans relative to the value of gross wealth. Secondly, the debt-to-income ratio (equation 
10) constitutes a measure of the stock of loans to the flow of disposable income in each 
 
11 Unlike in Zezza (2008), rent payments in this model are not directly dependent on the growth of income. This 
corresponds to the observation that income growth in the USA has lagged behind the growth of rent prices and 
total housing stock between 2005 and 2016 (Federal Reserve Economic Data St Louis Fed, 2017). 
12 This corresponds to the assumption of the “pecking order” in Setterfield and Kim (2013) stating that 
households treat savings as a “luxury that is foregone first” in the presence of debt repayments. 
13 Exclusion of rent payments from household consumption decisions is consistent with Zezza (2008). If rent 
payments are excluded from the consumption function (so that working class consumption depends on the entire 
value of gross income), consumption and loans of this group becomes so large that net wealth is persistently 
negative. 
14 While a weakness of this backward-looking approach to the formation of expectations is the possibility of 
systematically erroneous predictions if the economic variable is unstable, such adaptive expectations are 
preferred to the rational expectations hypothesis due to the presence of fundamental uncertainty in the economy. 
15 βw is assumed to be high during a boom, as in the early 2000s when lending norms were lax due to the 
perceived minimization of credit risk through securitization. In times of recessions, βw can be thought of as low 
as lenders are more concerned about creditworthiness, leading to stricter lending norms. 
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period. Finally, the debt-service-to-income ratio (equation 11) shows how much of gross 
income is directed towards debt repayments in each period.  
Worker households’ income and consumption 𝑌𝐷! = 𝜔!𝑤"𝐷𝐿!# + 𝑟$%𝑀!,'" − 𝑟!,'"𝐿!,'" − 𝑅     (1) 𝑌𝐺! = 𝑌𝐷! + 𝑟!,'"𝐿!,'" + 𝑅        (2) 𝐶! = 𝑐"(𝑌𝐺!,'" − 𝑅) + 𝑐(𝑉!,'"       (3) 𝑅 = 𝛾'"𝐻),'"𝐷𝑆𝑌),'"         (4) 𝛾 = 𝛾'" + 𝛾'" ∗ ℎ* ∗ 7 ∆,!,!,#$ − ∆,,#$8       (5) 
Worker households’ wealth 𝑀! = 𝑉! + 𝐿!          (6) ∆𝐿! = 𝛽!𝐶!,'" − 𝐷𝑆𝑌!𝐿!,'", 𝛽! > 0       (7) ∆𝑉! = 𝑌𝐷! − 𝐶! + ∆𝐿!         (8) 
Worker households’ leverage indicators 𝐷𝐴! = -%.%          (9) 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑌! = -%/0%          (10) 𝐷𝑆𝑌! = )%,#$-%,#$/1%           (11) 
4.2. Middle class: “leveraged homeowners” 
In defining the middle class, it has to be acknowledged that this group can be considered 
along a variety of dimensions. In economic analysis, the middle class is often defined in 
relative terms as the middle 60% of income earners, with incomes typically ranging from 
75% to 125% of the median income16. But characterization of the middle class is also linked 
to wealth ownership. Atkinson and Brandolini (2011) develop a wealth criterion to qualify 
the income definition of the middle class, classified as holding enough assets to be safe from 
the risk of falling into poverty for a certain period of time, e.g. 6 months, if income suddenly 
falls. They argue that asset-poor individuals may need to be excluded from the middle class 
 
16 Some studies extend the upper limit to as much as 300% of the median income because the 125% cut-off 
places a disproportionately large portion of the population in certain countries into the top category (Pressman, 
2007). 
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even if their income exceeds the poverty threshold. Furthermore, the middle class can be 
described according to social criteria such as class consciousness, social status, lifestyle, and 
type of employment, which influence the individual economic security and prospects 
(Savage, 2013).  
In the macro-modelling literature, Palley (2015) constitutes one of the first attempts at 
formalizing the middle class. He models a Goodwinian economy with three classes of 
households based on the type of employment. The upper class is identified with the richest 
1% of the population, corresponding to the top managers. The middle class is defined as the 
next 19%, consisting of middle managers. The working class corresponds to the bottom 80% 
and includes non-supervisory production workers. Palley’s model introduces a complex class 
struggle, where the middle managerial class has conflicts with both the upper and the 
working class. Since middle managers are assumed to own part of the capital stock, they 
benefit from increases in either the profit share or the wage share (Palley, 2015, p.240). 
Similar proposition regarding the simultaneous capitalist and non-capitalist nature of the 
middle class has been put forward by Wright (1997, 2009). 
While Palley’s model constitutes an important contribution to the literature, its conclusions 
concern the functional distribution of income rather than wealth. The middle class is seen to 
have contradicting interests and be in conflict with both the upper- and the lower-income 
groups. However, as argued before, the processes of financial sector transformation harmed 
wealth accumulation of the middle-income households, making their fate more similar to the 
working class in terms of their high leverage levels. Thus, the middle class is defined 
according to their balance sheet composition based on the stylized facts established in the 
earlier analysis of household wealth composition in the USA.  
In the present model, the middle class is classified as “leveraged homeowners”, as it is 
distinguished as a group whose balance sheets depend on housing purchased through 
mortgages. Wealth of leveraged homeowners increased in the 1990s and the 2000s due to the 
rising house prices, allowing for mortgage refinancing and home equity withdrawal, which 
was only feasible in the house price bubble. When the growth of house prices reversed in July 
2006, these households saw their wealth gains largely eroded. For these reasons, the middle 
class is assumed to have high leverage ratios. As argued before, the expansion of credit 
wasn’t accidental as mortgages underpinned the proliferation of asset-backed securities. 
Consequently, the existence of the middle class is strongly linked to the financial sector 
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transformation due to incentives of financial institutions to generate as many mortgages as 
possible to satisfy the growing demands of financial investors for securitized instruments. In 
the present model, securitization is related to the provision of credit to the middle class. 
Separation of the middle class from the working class is important to account for the impact 
of homeownership on inequality. As shown earlier, unlike asset-poor households (classified 
here as the working class), middle class households experienced large wealth losses in the 
past decades due to the reliance of their balance sheets on leveraged housing and the falling 
house prices around the time of the Great Recession (see U.S. SCF). Moreover, the middle 
class is distinct from the rentier household group because of disparate returns to wealth and 
lower capital income flows owing to less diversified asset composition (which relies on 
housing) and higher relative indebtedness. 
Real disposable income of the middle class (equation 12) consists of wage income 
(𝜔mw1DLwm), interest earned on bank deposits (rcbMm,-1), and the imputed rent on housing 
(rhm,-1hm,-1), less interest payments on loans (rlm,-1Lm,-1). The imputed rent corresponds to the 
return on the real value of housing owned by this group. Gross income is defined as income 
before debt payments17 (equation 13). Middle class households earn an exogenously 
determined portion 𝜔m	of the wage bill paid by firms to the working and middle class 
(w1DLwm), assumed to be at 60%. This group consumes a fraction c4 of net wealth and a 
portion c3 of gross income (equation 14). The marginal consumption propensities of the 
middle class are assumed to be lower than those of the working class and higher than those of 
the rentier class. Residual income after consumption and repayment of loans is saved as 
deposits (equation 16).  
We assume that the middle class accumulates mortgage debt to finance home purchases as 
well as part of their consumption (through home equity withdrawal). For simplicity, loans to 
the middle class are assumed to consist exclusively of mortgages. Loans demanded by 
middle-class households depends indirectly on the demand for housing via the consumption 
function. Borrowing of the middle class (equation 17) depends on their target consumption 
adjusted by parameter β and their repayment capacity, measured by the debt-service-to-
income ratio multiplied by the amount of credit granted in the previous period. Parameter β is 
analogous to the parameter βw in the workers loan demand function and reflects household 
 
17 This resembles the Haig-Simon income specification, where capital gains enter into the disposable income 
equation (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p.392). 
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lending norms. It is assumed that β is the same across the middle class and rentiers. Target 
consumption of the middle class is set based on regular consumption level in the previous 
period (due to the simple adaptive expectations), and relative to the consumption of rentiers 
adjusted by an emulation parameter η (equation 15). η corresponds to an exogenously set 
Ravina emulation parameter (Ravina, 2007).  
Net wealth of the middle class comprises the value of bank deposits, housing, and capital 
gains on houses, less loans (equation 18). All middle class households are assumed to be 
owner-occupiers of their property and not to rent out their houses. Demand for houses by the 
middle class (equation 19) depends positively on the growth rate of mortgages that 
commercial banks are willing to lend to this household group, adjusted by an exogenous 
parameter h1.  Equation 20 shows the real value of houses held by the middle class, and 
equation 21 defines capital gains on housing for this group. Return on housing is defined as 
the value of capital gains on houses relative to the value of housing times its price in the 
previous period (equation 22). As in the case of the working class, different measures of 
financial fragility for the middle class are presented, including the debt-to-asset ratio 
(equation 23), the debt-to-income ratio (equation 24) and the debt-service-to-income ratio 
(equation 25).  
Middle class households’ income and consumption 𝑌𝐷# = 𝜔#𝑤"𝐷𝐿!# + 𝑟$%𝑀#,'" − 𝑟2#,'"𝐿#,'" + 𝑟ℎ#,'"ℎ#,'"    (12) 𝑌𝐺# = 𝑌𝐷# + 𝑟2#,'"𝐿#,'"        (13) 𝐶# = 𝑐3𝑌𝐺#,'" + 𝑐4𝑉#,'"         (14) 𝐶#5 = 𝐶#,'" + 	𝜂𝐶),'"         (15) 
Middle class households’ wealth 𝑀# = 𝑉# + 𝐿# − 𝐻#         (16) Δ𝐿# = 𝛽𝐶#,'"5 − 𝐷𝑆𝑌#𝐿#,'", 𝛽 > 0       (17) ∆𝑉# = 𝑌𝐷# − 𝐶# + ∆𝐿# + 𝐶𝐺,#       (18) ∆𝐻# = 𝐻#,'" ∗ ℎ" ∗ ∆-&-&,#$        (19) ℎ# = ,&6'            (20) 𝐶𝐺,# = 𝐻#,'"∆𝑝7         (21) 
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 𝑟ℎ# = 81(&,&,#$6',#$               (22) 
Middle class households’ leverage indicators 𝐷𝐴# = -&.&9,&          (23) 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑌# = -&/0&          (24) 𝐷𝑆𝑌# = ))&,#$-&,#$/1&          (25) 
4.3. Rentier class: “the working rich” 
The rentier class is defined as owners of diversified wealth portfolios, with low relative 
indebtedness. In contrast to the other household groups, they saw rapid increases in their 
income and wealth since the 1980s and the smallest wealth losses in the aftermath of the 2007 
crisis. Their balance sheets are assumed to be composed of high-yielding financial assets and 
business equity alongside various forms of real estate, which differentiates this group from 
the middle class. Because we do not analyze the dynamics of investment expectations and 
realization among entrepreneurs, the definition of the capitalist class is narrowed down to 
rentiers. This corresponds to analysis by Wolff and Zacharias (2013), who apply a wealth 
threshold in addition to occupational categories to define capitalist households as those whose 
assets consist primarily of financial and business assets. 
The existing functional distribution studies often treat the rich as pure rentiers, who derive 
their income solely from capital ownership. This is also envisaged by Piketty – as wealth 
becomes inherited and compounding returns to wealth gradually exceed income growth over 
time, the rich abandon work and live from their returns to wealth. While this was true in the 
pre-Fordist era and is a plausible scenario for the future, it doesn’t describe the realities 
observed since the post-war period. Keister and Lee (2014) show that inheritance in the USA 
accounts for a small portion of the existing wealth of the rich. Moreover, households in the 
top 10% of the income distribution have captured an increasing share of wages since the 
1980s, which stems from the extremely high salaries paid to financial sector executives 
(Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; Philippon and Reshef, 2012).  
To account for the growing wage inequality, wages are included in the income of rentiers, so 
that the top group corresponds to the “working rich”. This complements the traditional view 
of the capitalist class. Rentiers are assumed to engage in work not because of necessity (as is 
in the case of the working and the middle class) but because institutional conditions turn 
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employment into an “investment strategy” for the rich, as they are able to use economic 
power associated with their high wealth to influence their earnings. Consequently, unlike the 
working and the middle class, they do not rely on their wages to maintain living standards. 
Furthermore, in contrast to most of the SFCM studies including household debt, the present 
model allows for indebtedness of the rich. The analysis of household balance sheet 
composition above revealed that the top income decile accumulated sizeable debt between 
1989-2013, constituting the most indebted income group in terms of the ownership rates and 
the amount of debt. What is different about the indebtedness of the rich is their debt 
accumulation motives. Rentiers are assumed to take on debt as an investment strategy to 
accumulate more assets (and potentially also to take advantage of various tax breaks; 
however, taxes are not included in the present version of the model). Because of lower 
interest rates on loans and higher returns to the diversified asset portfolio, the debt-service-to-
income ratio and the debt-to-asset ratio of the top income decile are assumed be the lowest 
among all households. Conversely, based on the earlier analysis a high debt-to-income ratio 
is assumed for this group, reflecting their large asset holdings, which allow for high debt 
accumulation relative to their income flows.  
Real disposable income of rentiers (equation 26) consists of wage income (w2DLr), interest 
income from bank deposits (rcbMr,-1), distributed profits of firms (DP), profits of commercial 
banks (BP), profits of institutional investors (FI), housing rent payments from the working 
class (R), as well as returns on housing (rhr,-1hr,-1), returns on business equity (re,-1e-1), and 
returns on shares of institutional investors (rs,-1sh-1), less interest paid on loans (rl,-1Lr,-1). 
Gross income is defined as income before debt repayments (equation 27). The working rich 
households’ wage income is part of the overall wage bill of firms and is given by the rentier 
wage rate w2 (defined in the next section in equation 64) and firms’ demand for labor 
performed by rentiers (DLr in equation 26). Rentiers consume a fraction c5 of their gross 
income and c6 of their net wealth, and their marginal consumption propensities are assumed 
to be the lowest among all households (equation 28). Residual savings after debt repayments 
are stored in the form of deposits (equation 29).  
Borrowing of rentiers (equation 30) depends on their past consumption, adjusted by 
parameter β, and loans repaid from the previous period. Net wealth of rentiers is given by the 
value of bank deposits, housing, firm equity, and institutional investors’ shares as well as 
capital gains on the latter three types of assets, less loans (equation 31). These capital gains 
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are defined in equations 41 to 43. Rentiers are assumed to be the sole buyers of firm equity 
and institutional investors’ shares. The allocation of rentiers’ wealth between houses, 
equities, and institutional investors’ shares is assumed to follow the Tobinesque portfolio 
principle, i.e. it depends on the relative rates of return offered on these assets (equations 32-
34), with bank deposits treated as residual. Real values of rentier housing, equity, and 
institutional investors’ shares holdings are given in equations 35 to 37.  
The rate of return on equity depends on the sum of distributed profits of firms and capital 
gains on equity relative to the nominal value of equity and its price in the previous period 
(equation 39). Price of firm equity is defined as the nominal value of equity E less a fraction x 
of firm investment spending I, adjusted by the real value of equity e (equation 38). The rate 
of return on rentier housing is determined by the sum of rent payments from the working 
class and rentiers’ capital gains on housing relative to the rentier housing stock and the price 
of housing in the previous period (equation 40). The price of housing as well as the price and 
the rate of return on institutional investors’ shares are described in the following section, in 
equations 55, 83, and 84 respectively. Equations 44 to 46 provide the leverage measures of 
the rentier households, i.e. the debt- to-asset ratio, the debt-to-income ratio, and the debt-
service-to-income ratio.  
Rentier households’ income and consumption 𝑌𝐷) = 𝑤(𝐷𝐿) + 𝑟$%𝑀),'" − 𝑟2,'"𝐿),'" + 𝐷𝑃 + 𝐵𝑃 + 𝐹𝐼 + 𝑅 +⋯ …+	𝑟ℎ),'"ℎ),'" + 𝑟:,'"𝑒'" + 𝑟;,'"𝑠ℎ'" (26) 𝑌𝐺) = 𝑌𝐷) + 𝑟2,'"𝐿),'"         (27) 𝐶) = 𝑐<𝑌𝐺),'" + 𝑐=𝑉),'"        (28) 
Rentier households’ wealth 𝑀) = 𝑉) + 𝐿) − 𝐻) − 𝐸 − 	𝑆𝐻		          (29) Δ𝐿) = 𝛽𝐶),'" − 𝐷𝑆𝑌)𝐿),'", 𝛽 > 0       (30) ∆𝑉) = 𝑌𝐷) − 𝐶) + ∆𝐿) + 𝐶𝐺,) + 𝐶𝐺> + 𝐶𝐺?,      (31)   𝐸 = (𝜆",* + 𝜆","𝑟:,'" + 𝜆",(𝑟$% + 𝜆",3 /0!,#$@!,#$ + 𝜆",4𝑟7),'" + 𝜆",<𝑟;,'")𝑉),'"/𝑝:,'"      (32) 𝐻) = (𝜆(,* + 𝜆(,"𝑟:,'" + 𝜆(,(𝑟$% + 𝜆(,3 /0!,#$@!,#$ + 𝜆(,4𝑟7),'" + 𝜆(,<𝑟;,'")𝑉),'"/𝑝7        (33) 𝑆𝐻 = (𝜆3,* + 𝜆3,"𝑟:,'" + 𝜆3,(𝑟$% + 𝜆3,3 /0!,#$@!,#$ + 𝜆3,4𝑟7),'" + 𝜆3,<𝑟;,'")𝑉),'"/𝑝;            (34) ℎ) = ,!6'          (35) 
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Rentier households’ leverage indicators 𝐷𝐴) = -!.!9-!9	,!9>9	?,         (44) 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑌) = -!/0!          (45) 𝐷𝑆𝑌) = )),#$-!,#$/1!          (46) 
 
4.4. Motives for debt accumulation 
Underpinning the distinction of different types of debt in the present model are differences in 
motives for debt accumulation across household groups. Contemporary analyses of 
household portfolio decisions are dominated by the life-cycle theory (Modigliani and 
Brumberg, 1954) and the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) approach 
(LCT/PIH). This framework is rooted in quantitative general equilibrium models and assumes 
that households endowed with perfect information about the distribution of their lifetime 
income smooth consumption over their life-cycle to maximize their utility subject to an inter-
temporal budget constraint, based on behavioral assumptions of the standard microeconomic 
theory (Debelle, 2004, p.2; Gravelle and Reese, 2012, pp.12-19). Consequently, consumer 
preferences are stable and exogenously determined by these consumption rankings.  
In LTC/PIH models, indebtedness is explained by households optimizing their consumption 
spending. Debt can never be excessive as it implies future income increases, i.e. it is assumed 
to generate a matching future flow of funds, and default is only possible due to unexpected 
external shocks to income (Bertola et al., 2006, p.33). This argument lacks understanding of 
the institutional changes in financial markets outlined in Section 2 and downplays the 
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massive expansion of credit via predatory lending practices induced by the high demand for 
securitized assets among financial investors and stagnant incomes. View of households as 
rational optimizing agents carefully planning their consumption patterns obscures the 
complexity of household portfolio decisions in the age of active financial markets and thus 
renders this approach unsuitable to explain the mechanisms of wealth distribution in the 21st 
century18. 
These weaknesses of the LTC/PIH approach are addressed by the heterodox insights into 
household consumption behavior (Lavoie, 2014, pp.95-96,98-99), which draw from the 
relative income hypothesis (Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949). They highlight the socio-
institutional determinants of household portfolio choices (Nell, 1992), which undermine the 
utility-maximizing view of wealth accumulation (Robinson, 1956; Pasinetti, 1981; Eichner, 
1986; Arestis, 1992) and allow for a more realistic examination of the mechanisms of 
inequality (Szymborska, 2017, p.145).  
As indicated in Section 3, consumption emulation has recently emerged as a potentially 
important driver of borrowing (see Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; Pressman and Scott, 2009). 
However, while in the existing SFCM studies emulation is applied to low-income workers, 
the present model restricts relative consumption to the middle class. This approach is more 
appropriate as emulation motives are more likely to be relevant among more affluent 
households belonging to the middle class, who can afford necessities such as owning their 
house. In contrast, the working class is more concerned with maintaining their living 
standards in light of the rising living costs (e.g. rent payments). Their demand for loans is 
thus more likely to be driven by necessitous borrowing concerns (see Pollin, 1988) rather 
than their desire to follow lifestyles of the rich. It would be possible to introduce emulation of 
the middle class consumption by the working class, which would be in line with the 
expenditure cascades hypothesis where each distributional group emulates consumption of 
the one just above it (Frank et al., 2014). However, the present model it is assumed that due 
to sluggishly growing incomes and increases in house prices, rising credit demand among 
 
18 Due to empirical problems, the LTC/PIH framework has seen numerous extensions aiming to improve its 
explanatory power. These incorporate factors which impede accurate formation of future income expectations, 
namely liquidity constraints in credit markets (Gross and Souleles 2002), precautionary saving (Carroll 1997), 
bequest motives (Cagetti and DiNardi, 2008), and wealth effects of asset price increases (Mehra, 2001; Duca et 
al., 2012). Despite these various extensions of the standard LTC/PIH framework, its basic premise of rational 
optimizing agents carefully planning their consumption patterns over the lifecycle remains. Another problematic 
feature of this literature is its assumption that financial innovation and subprime credit expansion should act as a 
relief to credit-constrained households, allowing for a more optimal distribution of economic resources (Barba 
and Pivetti, 2009, p.119; Elul, 1995). 
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low-income households is motivated by sustaining a constant standard of living rather than 
achievement of a particular social status. 
We also do not include relative consumption concerns in the rentiers’ credit demand function. 
It should be mentioned, however, that relative consumption motives are bound to be 
especially strong among the richest 10%, who engage in luxury goods consumption and aim 
to elevate their social status and pursue “celebrity lifestyles”. Much of the increase in the top 
10% share of income is driven by the rising share of the top 1% (Piketty 2014). However, 
high aggregation of the SFCM and the elaborate character of the current model prevent us 
from modelling such precise consumption behavior of the different income groups within the 
top income decile. 
In sum, distinguishing between differences in wealth accumulation and leverage levels across 
the three household groups allows for a more precise identification of the distributional 
channels in financialized economies and of the points of financial fragility defining 
macroeconomic stability. This is particularly important considering the changing features of 
the financialized economies in the post-crisis era, such as the increasing accumulation of 
unsecured debt among low-wealth households and restructuring of the housing market, which 
has created a deep divide in wealth accumulation opportunities and the resulting income 
flows between homeowners and renters. In this context, wealth ownership emerges as a 
powerful channel of distribution, which contributes to macroeconomic instability in new 
ways than before the Great Recession. 
 
5. Simulation analysis 
To formally validate usefulness of the proposed conceptualization of households based on 
balance sheet composition, we construct a stock-flow consistent model of inequality 
determination19. Choice of SFCM is motivated by its integrated analysis of balance sheet 
composition across the real and the financial sector (Godley and Lavoie, 2007). This feature 
yields itself to the examination of the role of household wealth heterogeneity in generating 
inequality. Moreover, this method has been widely used in the macro-modelling literature on 
the distributive consequences of financialization (see Section 3). However, unlike the current 
literature which focuses on the macroeconomic dynamics resulting from unequal distribution, 
the aim of the simulation analysis is to examine how the introduced balance sheet complexity 
 
19 Simulation was conducted using R and the code is available upon request. 
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influences the predicted levels of inequality. For this reason, we compare trends in inequality 
and leverage in the proposed three-class framework and the traditional two-class approach. 
The hypothesis is that the above definition of households based on balance sheet structures 
leads to higher income inequality levels and financial fragility than the dichotomous division 
between workers and capitalists. 
5.1. Model setup 
The model is calibrated using the US data. The analysis focuses on the personal distribution 
of wealth and income and analyzes the evolution of the Gini index for income and wealth. 
The model considers a closed economy with no government and consists of five sectors: a 
three-class household sector (outlined in the previous section), a simple firm sector, and a 
three-tier financial sector comprising of commercial banks, special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs)/underwriters, and institutional investors. This definition of the financial sector aims to 
capture the increased complexity of modern financial institutions by introducing 
securitization into the model dynamics (Nikolaidi, 2015). A limitation of this model setup is 
that several important factors which played a relevant role in the concentration of income and 
wealth are excluded, including globalization, privatization of pensions, the structure of 
taxation (Yunker, 2010; Stiglitz, 2014), and inheritance (Yunker, 1998; Isaac, 2007). Table 1 
shows the balance sheet matrix, while Table 2 presents the transaction flow matrix. The 
legend of model variables and details of parameter calibration and initial values can be found 
in the Appendix. 
[Table 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
5.2 Firms 
We assume no inflation and a price of output equal to unity, so that nominal and real values 
coincide. Firm profits are residual (equation 47) and the profit share is determined 
exogenously (through a mark-up over unit labor costs). It is assumed that firms produce 
housing as well as a single capital good on demand so that capital inventories are not taken 
into account. Firms retain an exogenously determined share sf of their profits (equation 48) 
and distribute the rest to rentiers (equation 49). Output is given by the consumption spending 
of households and investment in productive capital and housing (equation 50). The potential 
output of the economy is set in proportion to an exogenously given full-capacity capital-
output ratio 𝜑 (equation 51). 
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Firm investment is defined as the growth rate of capital stock (equations 52-53). Firms’ 
production of housing depends on the ratio of the demand for housing from the middle class 
and rentiers to the supply of housing by firms in the previous period as well as on the growth 
rate of the price of housing, adjusted by exogenous parameters h2 and h3 respectively 
(equation 54). It is assumed that a part of the housing stock may be unsold in a given period, 
depending on whether the demand for mortgages from the middle class (and so, indirectly, 
their demand for housing) is met by commercial banks (note that the Tobinesque portfolio 
equation implies that all houses demanded by rentiers are sold). The price of housing is 
determined by the ratio of the growth rate of the demand for housing from the household 
sector relative to the growth rate of the supply of housing by firms (both given for the 
previous period), adjusted by an exogenous parameter h4 (equation 55).  To	maintain	the	focus	on	household	wealth	structures,	the	wage	bargaining	process	is	simplified.	Firms	are	assumed	to	demand	labor	from	either	the	working	class	and	the	middle	class	(DLwm)	or	from	rentiers	(DLr).	Firms’	wage	bill	(equation	56)	is	assumed	to	be	divided	into	wages	paid	to	the	working	class	and	the	middle	class	(w1DLwm)	and	wages	paid	to	rentiers	(w2DLr).	A	homogenous	wage	rate	w1	is	negotiated	by	the	working	class	and	the	middle	class	as	a	fraction	sw	of	their	labor	productivity	𝜆wm	(equation	57).	Because	the	price	of	output	is	assumed	to	be	unity,	sw	corresponds	to	the	wage	share	of	these	workers	in	total	income	(Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2015, p.12). It	depends	on	an	exogenous	labor	market	parameter	w0	less	the	unemployment	rate	for	workers	from	the	working	class	and	the	middle	class,	adjusted	by	an	exogenous	parameter	w1	(equation	58)20.	This	unemployment	rate	is	determined	by	the	change	in	firms’	demand	for	labor	performed	by	workers	from	the	working	class	and	the	middle	class	relative	to	the	number	of	these	workers	in	the	population	(equation	59).	Demand	for	labor	performed	by	the	working	class	and	the	middle	class	depends	on	the	ratio	of	actual	output	to	labor	productivity	of	these	households	in	the	previous	period	(equation	60).	Following	Dafermos	and	Papatheodorou (2015), demand	for	rentier	labor	is	given	by	the	ratio	of	potential	output	to	rentier	labor	productivity	in	the	previous	period	(equation	61).	For	simplicity,	labor	productivity	for	all	types	of	workers	is	assumed	to	grow	at	an	exogenously	set	labor	productivity	growth	rate	g𝜆	(equations	62-
 
20 As noted by Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2015) the negative impact of the unemployment rate on the wage 
share reflects the reserve army effect. 
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 63).	The	rentier	wage	rate (equation 64) is linked to a variable remuneration dependent on firm 
profits and is given by an exogenous premium mw > 1 over the other workers’ wage rate, as 
well as the profit sharing element 𝜌h	adjusted by the number of rentiers Nr and an exogenous 
parameter 𝜌	∈ (0,1) reflecting the relative importance of profit remuneration in the rentier 
wage rate determination (ibid., p.13).  
Firm output and profits 𝑇𝑃 = 𝑌 −𝑊                      (47) 𝑅𝑃 = 𝑠I𝑇𝑃                      (48) 𝐷𝑃 = 𝑇𝑃 − 𝑅𝑃                      (49) 𝑌 = 𝐶! + 𝐶# + 𝐶) + 𝐼 + ∆𝐻                   (50) 𝑌∗ = 𝜑𝐾          (51) 
Firm investment and housing production       𝐼 = 𝑔K𝐾'"                    (52) Δ𝐾 = 𝐼                      (53) Δ𝐻 = 𝐻'" ∗ 7ℎ( L,&,#$9,!,#$M,#$ + ℎ3 L6''6',#$M6',#$ 8       (54) Δ𝑝7 = 𝑝7,'" ∗ ℎ4 77(,&9,!)'L,&,#$9,!,#$M(,&,#$9,!,#$) 8'" U,',#$,#$ V'"W 8     (55) 
Firm wage bill 𝑊 = 𝑤"𝐷𝐿!# +𝑤(𝐷𝐿)         (56) 𝑤" = 𝑠!𝜆!#           (57) 𝑠! = 𝑤* −𝑤"𝑈𝑅!#          (58) ∆𝑈𝑅!# = 𝑈𝑅!#,'" ∗ ∆0-%&(N%9N&)         (59) 𝐷𝐿!# = /#$O%&,#$          (60) 𝐷𝐿) = /#$∗O!,#$           (61) ∆𝜆!# = 𝜆!#,'" ∗ 𝑔O          (62) ∆𝜆) = 𝜆),'" ∗ 𝑔O          (63) 𝑤( = (1 − 𝜌) ∗ 𝑚! ∗ 𝑤" + 𝜌 ∗ ℎ ∗ U/'!$∗0-%&'("'P)∗#%∗!$∗0-!N! V   (64) 
5.3. Financial sector 
We assume a three-tier financial sector, composed of commercial banks and two types of 
non-bank financial institutions: underwriters (and their SPVs) and institutional investors. 
26 
 
 
Commercial banks accept household deposits and create money through lending to 
households. A part of mortgages to the middle class is securitized and transformed into 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by the sector of SPVs and underwriters. MBS are 
subsequently bought by institutional investors in the form of coupon payments. Shares issued 
by institutional investors based on the value of their MBS holdings are then purchased by 
rentiers.  
Commercial banks 
Commercial bank profits (equation 65) are defined as the sum of interest payments on 
consumer loans of the working class, non-securitized mortgages of the middle class, and 
loans to rentiers, less interest payments on deposits to households21. A constant interest rate 
on deposits is assumed for all households, equal to the exogenously set central bank base rate. 
The interest rate on loans is set by charging an exogenous premium 𝛼 over the deposit rate 
(equation 66).  
Each household group faces a different rate of interest on loans, depending on the perception 
of their creditworthiness by commercial banks. The interest on loans to the working class is 
higher than the general interest rate on household loans by a premium 𝜋	(equation 67). This 
risk premium depends on exogenous parameters 𝜋0 and 𝜋1, which capture institutional 
conditions in the financial markets, as well as the debt-to-income ratio and the debt-service-
to-income ratio of the working class (equation 68). Loans to the middle class are subject to a 
mortgage rate (equation 69), defined as a spread over the commercial bank lending rate 
(equation 70). The mortgage spread depends positively on the parameter 𝜋0, the debt-service-
to-income ratio, and the debt-to-income ratio of the middle class, adjusted by an exogenous 
parameter 𝜋2, and negatively on the rate of return on mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
adjusted by an exogenous parameter 𝜋3.  
All bank profits are transferred to rentiers, who are assumed to own commercial banks and 
the remaining financial institutions. This, together with the assumption that assets of rentiers 
outweigh their debt holdings, leads to the assumption that rentiers in the present model 
remain creditors in net terms. This is because their debt payments are ultimately returned to 
them in the form of bank profits.  
 
21 The simulated steady-state value of the interest rates on mortgages to the middle class is 6.8%, while the 
interest rate on loans to the working class is 8.8%. 
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A part of mortgages to the middle class is securitized and sold to underwriters and their SPVs 
(equation 71), and the rest is kept on the commercial banks’ balance sheets (equation 72). 
The share of securitized loans (equation 73) depends on an exogenous parameter s0 (capturing 
institutional conditions such as the degree of financial regulation) and the target yield on 
MBS (given by the past yield under the assumption of simple adaptive expectations), adjusted 
by an exogenous parameter s1. The redundant equation of the model is derived in equations 
74-78.  𝐵𝑃 = 𝑟!,'"𝐿!,'" + 𝑟2#,'"𝐿#N?,'" + 𝑟2,'"𝐿),'" − 𝑟8Q(𝑀!,'" +𝑀#,'" +𝑀),'")         (65) 𝑟2 = 𝑟8Q + 𝛼                     (66) 𝑟! = 𝑟2 + 𝜋                      (67) 𝜋 = 𝜋* + 𝜋"𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑌!,'"𝐷𝑆𝑌!,'"                    (68) 𝑟2# = 𝑟2 + 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑚                    (69) 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑚 = 𝜋* + 𝜋(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑌#,'"𝐷𝑆𝑌# − 𝜋3𝑟.Q?,'"                 (70) 𝐿#? = 𝑠𝐿#                      (71) 𝐿#N? = (1 − 𝑠)𝐿#                     (72) 𝑠 = 𝑠* + 𝑠"𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑.Q?,'"                     (73) 𝐿; = 𝐿;,'" + ∆𝐿R          (74) 𝐿R = 𝐿! + 𝐿# + 𝐿)          (75) 𝑀; = 𝑀;,'" + ∆𝐿;          (76) 𝑀R = 𝑀! +𝑀# +𝑀)          (77) 𝑀; = 𝑀R                      (78) 
SPVs/underwriters 
The sector of underwriters and their SPVs purchases securitized loans to the middle class 
from commercial banks and transforms them into MBS (equation 79). MBS are assumed to 
be of the single “pass-through” type rather than consisting of various pooled MBS (Nikolaidi, 
2015, p.4). All MBS are sold to institutional investors in the form of coupon payments 
without any fee (equation 80), at a coupon rate determined by an exogenous spread over the 
mortgage rate (equations 81). Consequently, the sector of underwriters and SPVs 
accumulates no profits.  𝑀𝐵𝑆 = 𝑀𝐵𝑆'" + ∆𝐿#?                    (79) 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑀𝐵𝑆'"                    (80) 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝 = 𝑟2# − 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑.Q?                    (81) 
Institutional investors 
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The sector of institutional investors is assumed to comprise entities such as pension funds, 
mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, and investment banks (see Davis, 2003). 
They purchase MBS from underwriters and their SPVs as coupon payments, which are 
distributed to rentiers in the form of institutional investors’ profits FI (equation 82). 
Institutional investors’ demand for MBS follows the portfolio principle (equation 83), where 
the return on MBS (equation 84) depends on the MBS yield (equation 85) and capital gains 
on MBS holdings (equation 86).  
Institutional investors are assumed to finance their operations by issuing shares (SH), which 
are purchased by rentier households at a price ps, set in reference to the price of MBS 
adjusted by an exogenous parameter 𝜃0 (equation 87). The rate of return on the institutional 
investors’ shares (rs) is given by the ratio of coupon payments to the amount demanded by 
rentiers in the form of institutional investors’ shares in the previous period (equation 88).  𝐹𝐼 = 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑌                      (82) 𝑝.Q? = LS$-9S$$)./0,#$M?,#$.Q?#$                     (83) 𝑟.Q? = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑.Q? + 81./06./0,#$.Q?#$                   (84) 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑.Q? = 8TUCV/6./0,#$.Q?#$                    (85) 𝐶𝐺.Q? = 𝑀𝐵𝑆'"∆𝑝.Q?                    (86) ∆𝑝; = 𝑝;,'" ∗ 𝜃*𝑝.Q?         (87) 𝑟𝑠 = WB?,#$                      (88) 
5.4. Outcome variables 
The proposed model focuses on personal income and wealth inequality, and analyzes how the 
increased complexity of household balance sheet composition affects the Gini index of 
income (equation 89) and wealth (equation 90), expecting the proposed balance sheet 
heterogeneity to produce more acute long-run polarization of income and wealth than 
simulated otherwise. It also examines the impact of household balance sheet complexity on 
macroeconomic stability, measured by the debt-to-income ratio of the entire economy 
(equation 91). 
Wealth inequality levels as measured by the Gini index are expected to be higher than for 
income. This is because the inclusion of wealth heterogeneity in the model creates forces 
which pull the upper class even further away from the rest of the distribution, drowning the 
middle and working class in debt. In this model, these forces are identified with unequal 
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returns to assets accumulated across different household groups and disparities in borrowing 
conditions and leverage. Apart from income transfers through repayments of loans from 
commercial banks, inequality is influenced by securitization, which transfers wealth of the 
middle-income group to the upper class through differences in asset ownership. Furthermore, 
inclusion of relative consumption concerns allows for a distinction between different motives 
for debt accumulation across households and their implications for macroeconomic stability. 
The model is simulated for 100 periods. Simulation results of the full model outlined above 
are compared with four reduced form specifications without features introduced in this 
baseline model: (1) a pure capitalist class specification, in which rentiers derive income 
solely from capital ownership and profits and thus receive no wages (an additional reduced 
specification is run that excludes rentier debt from the pure capitalist scenario); (2) a scenario 
without relative consumption determining the demand for loans among the middle class; (3) a 
specification without securitization (restricting the financial sector to include only 
commercial banks); and (4) a specification without the middle class (which corresponds to 
the traditional dichotomous division between workers and capitalists and excludes relative 
consumption effects). The latter scenario without the middle class accounts for securitization 
of loans to the working class instead22. This allows us to gauge the impact of household 
wealth heterogeneity proposed in this model on personal distribution of income and wealth, 
and on macroeconomic stability. 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 = "(N1X∑ |𝑌𝐻Y − 𝑌𝐻Z|𝑁Y𝑁ZY,Z    where i,j = w, m, r23   (89) 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼@ = "(N1X@∑ |𝑉𝐻Y − 𝑉𝐻Z|𝑁Y𝑁ZY,Z    where i,j = w, m, r   (90) 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑌 = -%9-&9-!/                      (91) 𝑌𝐻Y = /02N2	      where i,j = w, m, r   (92) 𝑉𝐻Y = @2N2	      where i,j = w, m, r   (93) 𝜇 = /0%9/0&9/0!N%9N&9N!           (94) 𝜇𝑉 = @%9@&9@!N%9N&9N!          (95) 
 
22 A different version of that latter scenario was run, where securitization was excluded entirely from the 
reduced specification without the middle class; the results obtained are similar to the scenario presented here. 
23 Note that N is the total number of households: N = Nw+Nm+Nr. 
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6. Results and discussion 
Table 3 presents results of the simulation analysis. In the full model, higher levels of wealth 
inequality are observed than of income inequality, which corresponds to inequality patterns 
observed in the data. The simulated steady-state value of the Gini index is 0.83 for net wealth 
and 0.59 for income24. The values are consistent with the recent estimates based on data from 
the U.S. SCF. In contrast to other surveys of household income and wealth (namely the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics), the U.S. SCF oversamples rich households to account for the 
impact of systematic non-response of wealthy households that is common in household 
survey data. Using data from the U.S. SCF, Wolff (2017) estimates a value of 0.87 for the 
Gini index of net wealth and 0.57 for pre-tax income in 2013. 
It needs to be noted that the U.S. SCF collects data on pre-tax income and net wealth, which 
leads to higher estimated values of the Gini coefficients compared to other sources of data. 
For instance, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Gini index of income 
was 0.42 in 2016 for income after taxes and transfers, compared to a value of 0.59 for market 
income and 0.51 for income before taxes and transfers (CBO 2019)25. In comparison, the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates a value of 0.481 for the 
Gini index of income in 2016, rising to 0.486 in 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau 2019). 
The present model excludes taxes and transfers, which explains the proximity of the 
simulated Gini index values to the U.S. SCF estimates (although the simulated Gini index for 
income is close to the CBO’s estimate of market income inequality of 0.59). The simulated 
value of the Gini index for income is slightly higher than in the U.S. SCF as the model 
excludes transfer income (which tends to make the income distribution more egalitarian). The 
value of the Gini coefficient for net wealth simulated in the model is lower than the U.S. SCF 
values estimated for the recent years. This can be explained by the fact that the present model 
does not account for retirement wealth, which has been characterized by high levels of 
inequality (the author estimated a 0.86 Gini coefficient for this component of wealth using 
the 2013 U.S. SCF). 
 
24 The simulated value of the income Gini index is more empirically accurate that the simulated value of 0.22 in 
Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2015). 
25 The CBO defines market income as income earned from non-governmental sources, including labor, business, 
capital, and retirement income (CBO 2019). Income before taxes and transfers additionally accounts for social 
insurance benefits. 
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In addition, different measures of leverage are simulated for each household group to analyze 
the impact of the model features on financial fragility. The simulated values of leverage 
measures are consistent with the empirical observations in Section 2. The middle class 
emerges as the most leveraged in terms of the debt-service-to-income ratio, which is 
simulated to reach 6.9% for this group, 5.3% for the working class, and 4.3% for rentiers. 
This ordering is consistent with Figure 3, although the simulated magnitudes are lower. This 
occurs as the model only considers one type of debt payments for each household group 
(either consumer debt or mortgages).  
Moreover, the steady-state values of the debt-to-asset ratio are simulated to be the highest for 
the working class at 63.4%, compared to 33.8% for the middle class and 17.9% for rentiers. 
These values are higher than observed in the data, in which middle-income households were 
found to have the highest debt-to-asset ratios. The greater value simulated by the model for 
working class households may be explained by the lack of housing on the asset side of their 
balance sheets in the model.  
Lastly, as was expected, rentiers are simulated to have the highest value of the steady-state 
debt-to-income ratio, at 142.9%. The simulated steady-state values of the ratio for the middle 
and the working class are 112.8% and 66.4% respectively. Table 3 also reports the steady-
state value of the debt-to-income ratio of the whole simulated economy, which settles at 
108.2%. This is slightly higher than the observed value of approximately 100% of the 
household debt-to-GDP ratio in the USA around the time of the Great Recession (Federal 
Reserve Economic Data St. Louis, 2017).  
[Table 3 here]  
The results of the baseline scenario are generally robust to different parameter values26. In a 
univariate sensitivity analysis (where parameters are changed one at a time), the simulated 
values of the inequality are the most sensitive to parameters influencing the wage rate for the 
middle class and the working class (namely the labor market parameters w0 and w1 and 
productivity growth rate g𝜆), the firm profit retention rate sf, parameters affecting the demand 
and the repayment of loans for the working class and the middle class (𝛽w	and	π0), parameter 
influencing the price of the institutional investors’ shares 𝜃0, the marginal consumption 
propensities out of income for all households (c1, c3, and c5), and the marginal propensity to 
 
26 Details of the sensitivity analysis are available upon request. 
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consume out of wealth for the middle class and rentiers (c4 and c6)27. In addition to these 
parameters, the simulated values of the leverage measures are also sensitive to the values of 
the central bank interest rate rcb and parameters influencing the demand and repayment of 
loans for the middle class and the household sector in general (𝛼,	𝛽,	𝜂, and π2)28. These results 
suggest that both wealth and income channels are important in influencing the levels of 
inequality and leverage in this model, particularly those pertaining to wage determination, 
consumption, and the demand for and repayment of loans.  
An additional robustness check has also been performed, using a multivariate sensitivity 
analysis in which all parameter values are altered simultaneously, in order to replicate a crisis 
scenario29. This multivariate analysis shows that inequality measures increase in result of the 
shock to the parameters, reaching higher steady-state values compared to the baseline 
scenario (0.88 for wealth and 0.64 for income). Moreover, the simulated values of 
households’ debt-to-income ratios and the debt-service-to-income ratios initially rise and then 
fall below their baseline values, while the debt-to-asset ratios increase to a higher level than 
in the baseline, particularly for the working class and the middle class households. 
Comparison of the reduced specification results with the full model shows that the modelled 
heterogeneity of balance sheets among different household groups matters for inequality and 
macroeconomic stability. Firstly, exclusion of the rentier wage results in lower simulated 
steady-state values of the Gini index for income and wealth (of 0.54 and 0.81 respectively), 
as well as the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-income ratios. This suggests that accounting for 
diverse income sources is important in understanding the rise of income and wealth 
inequality. 
Moreover, removing relative consumption effects from the model leads to lower steady-state 
values of the three leverage measures for the middle class, as well as the debt-to-income ratio 
for the economy as a whole. Additionally, excluding securitization from the model yields 
 
27 The simulated values of the Gini index for income and wealth inequality are higher in response to: a fall in w0 
and w1, a decrease in the profit retention rate sf, a lower marginal propensity to consume out of income for 
rentiers c5, a higher 𝛽w. Income inequality also increases following a reduction in the rate of productivity growth 
g𝜆. In addition, the Gini index for wealth rises when: the marginal propensity to consume out of income for the 
working class and the middle class increases (c1 and c3), the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth for 
the middle class (c4) increases and falls for rentiers (c6), and when 𝜃0 or π0 increase. 
28 Leverage measures increase in response to: an increase in w0 and w1, a higher marginal propensity to consume 
out of income for rentiers c5, a higher 𝛽 and 𝛽w, and a fall in 𝜃0. In addition, the debt-to-income ratio for the 
economy increases following: a lower 𝛼, an increase in 𝜂, a higher rcb, and a fall in π0 or π2. The debt-service-to-
income ratio for households additionally rises when 𝛼 and π0 increase. 
29 Detailed results are available on request. 
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higher simulated steady-state values of the debt-service-to-income ratio for the middle class, 
the debt-to-asset ratio for rentiers, and the debt-to-income ratio for workers. Nevertheless, the 
latter scenario also results in a lower steady-state value of the debt-to-income ratio for the 
middle class, rentiers, and the economy as a whole. These results replicate the empirical 
finding that the period of securitization was associated with increased financial fragility for 
the economy. 
Furthermore, comparing the baseline model results with the reduced specification in which 
the middle class is excluded leads to lower simulated steady-state values of the Gini index for 
income at 0.54, but higher values for the Gini coefficient for wealth at 0.86. Additionally, the 
reduced specification without the middle class yields a higher simulated value of the steady-
state debt-to-income ratio for the economy. The middle class in the baseline model is 
distinguished by the presence of housing on their balance sheets. Consequently, the finding of 
higher wealth inequality in the reduced specification without the middle class indicates that 
homeownership has an equalizing effect on wealth distribution among households. However, 
it simultaneously contributes to greater macroeconomic instability and higher income 
inequality in the context of financial sector transformation, as evidenced by the lower 
simulated values of the steady-state Gini index for income and the debt-to-income ratio for 
the economy in the reduced model. These results suggest that the dichotomous classification 
of households typically encountered in stock-flow consistent models obscures some channels 
of macroeconomic instability and personal income distribution. 
Moreover, the model results reveal that due to disparities in debt accumulation motives across 
households, household leverage needs to be analyzed holistically. Each measure of financial 
fragility captures a different aspect of indebtedness and does not represent the true capacity of 
households to handle financial distress when analyzed by itself. Importantly, the analysis 
finds that inclusion of the socially determined component in the loan demand function of the 
middle class raises their leverage, which increases macroeconomic instability30. 
Consequently, the present analysis considering the different motives for debt holdings, 
together with the structural conditions of asset accumulation, is instrumental in understanding 
the implications of rising indebtedness for financial fragility for individual households and at 
 
30 This is consistent with Zezza (2008) and Caverzasi and Godin (2015) where an increase in consumption 
emulation in simulated to raise the aggregate debt-to-income ratio. While in this model we do not observe 
changes to the results following the shock to the emulation parameter, comparison of results of the full model 
with the reduced specification without emulation shows that the presence of relative consumption concerns 
leads to higher macroeconomic volatility measured by the debt-to-income ratio. 
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macroeconomic level. The three-class household specification presented in this paper is 
conducive to capturing this diversity of debt accumulation motives. 
Note that the middle class constitutes the largest household group in this analysis, as it is 
assumed to account for 50% of households. Thus, issues associated with heterogeneity of this 
group need to be acknowledged. We argue that heterogeneity issues cannot be avoided in 
analyzing the household sector. The three-class division adopted here is superior to the two-
class conceptualization of households in the macro-modelling literature because it shows a 
more intricate channels of inequality determination in times of financial sector transformation 
arising from household balance sheet heterogeneity, which altered the traditionally envisaged 
economic relationships underpinning inequality and macroeconomic stability.  
It is possible to extend the division of households even further, which has been done by 
Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2015), who distinguish between five groups of households 
depending on their employment status, skill level, and the type of income earned. Such 
detailed division is not necessary in the present framework for two reasons. Firstly, it would 
introduce a considerable degree of complexity to an already elaborate model of 
heterogeneous households. Secondly, in the aggregate framework of SFCM, it would be 
difficult to meaningfully break down social classes into upper/lower groups and introduce a 
drastically different picture of balance sheets than that already provided in the three-class 
model. This is because at the aggregate level the most important distinctions in wealth 
accumulation possibilities are already made. 
On the whole, modelling of household wealth heterogeneity in the manner developed in this 
paper provides new insights into the channels of income and wealth transfers to the top of the 
income distribution compared to the conceptualization of households based on income 
sources alone. Securitization of mortgages to the middle class constitutes an indirect transfer 
of income and wealth from the middle to the rentier class, together with payments of housing 
rents by the working class. Moreover, holdings and payments of debt provide an indirect 
transfer of income from the working and the middle class to the rentiers, while 
homeownership among the middle class acts to reduce wealth inequality. These distributional 
channels are summarized in Figure 3. 
[Figure 3 here] 
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7. Concluding remarks  
This paper analyzed the relationship between household balance sheet complexity and 
inequality in the context of financial sector transformation in the USA since the 1980s. The 
paper argued that by expanding wealth accumulation among low-to-middle-income 
households and deepening wage disparities, changes in financial intermediation, financial 
deregulation, and securitization have highlighted the limitations of the dichotomous division 
of households in the Post Keynesian literature in explaining inequality. The paper proposed a 
new approach to inequality determination in the Post Keynesian literature, focused on 
disparities in household wealth structures. The present analysis is one of the first attempts in 
the Post Keynesian literature to formalize the channels of personal income and wealth 
distribution in financialized economies through disparities in household wealth ownership (in 
addition to differences in income sources that are typically analyzed in SFCM). The key 
contributions of the paper are: (1) to provide a narrative of how institutional changes in the 
economy and the financial sector have led to greater complexity of household balance sheet 
structures across the personal distribution of income and wealth; (2) to incorporate 
conceptualization of a three-class household sector based on wealth structures, rather than 
income sources alone, into the SFCM framework; (3) to show that the three-class taxonomy 
of households including the middle class of leveraged homeowners produces higher levels of 
personal income inequality and macroeconomic instability compared to the conventional 
dichotomous view of the household sector in the Post Keynesian SFCM literature; and (4) to 
demonstrate that homeownership has an equalizing effect on the personal distribution of 
wealth using the SFCM approach. The findings of this paper are important for analyzing 
inequality in the context of financial sector transformation because they show that explicit 
consideration of wealth composition and the diversity of leverage and debt accumulation 
motives is essential in understanding the rising levels of inequality and macroeconomic 
fragility in financialized economies like the USA. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Calibration 
Calibration is performed based on three criteria. Firstly, the latest available record common to 
the largest number of variables is identified with 2014. Secondly, if no data is available, 
parameter values are taken from previous studies or are assumed by the author based on 
economic intuition. Thirdly, for securitization parameters, a pre-2007 average is taken to 
simulate the securitization boom scenario. 
[Table A1 here] 
A.2. Initial values for endogenous variables 
[Table A2 here] 
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Figure 1. Balance sheet composition by income group, USA 1989-2013 (source: author’s calculations based on 
the U.S. S.C.F.) 
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Figure 2. Leverage by income group, USA 1989-2013 (source: author’s calculations based on the U.S. S.C.F.) 
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Figure 3. Distributional channels in the three-class SFC model (source: author’s elaboration) 
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Table 1 Balance sheet matrix (source: author’s elaboration) 
 
 
 
Households 
Firms Commercial banks 
Underwriters and 
SPVs 
Institutional 
investors Sum Working class Middle class Rentier class 
Deposits +Mw +Mm +Mr  –Mw–Mm–Mr   0 
Loans –Lw –Lm –Lr  +Lw+LmNS+Lr +LmS  0 
Capital    +K    +K 
Houses  +Hm +Hr +H    +H 
Equity   +E –E    0 
MBS      –MBS +MBS 0 
Institutional 
investors shares   +SH    –SH 0 
Net worth Vw Vm Vr Vf Vb Vs VI V 
Table 2 Transaction flow matrix (source: author’s elaboration) 
 
 
Households Firms Commercial banks SPVs/underwriters Institutional investors 
Sum Working 
class Middle class 
Rentier 
class Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Consumption –Cw –Cm –Cr +Cw+Cm+Cr          0 
Investment    +I –I       0 
Wages +𝜔ww1DLwm +𝜔mw1DLwm +w2DLr –W        0 
Firm profits   +DP –TP +RP       0 
Bank profits   +BP   –BP      0 
Inst. invest. 
profits   +FI       –FI  0 
Coupon 
payments        –COUPAY  +COUPAY  0 
Interest on 
deposits +rcb*Mw +rcb*Mm +rcb*Mr   –rcb*M      0 
Interest on 
loans –rw*Lw –rlm*Lm –rl*Lr   
+rw*Lw+rl*Lr 
+rlm*LmNS  +rlm*LmS    0 
Rent on 
housing –R  +R         0 
Δ Deposits –ΔMw –ΔMm –ΔMr    +ΔM     0 
Δ Loans +ΔLw +ΔLm +ΔLr    –ΔLw–ΔLr –ΔLmNS 
 –ΔLmS   0 
Δ Capital    +ΔK –ΔK       0 
Δ Houses  –ΔHm –ΔHr  
+ΔHm 
+ΔHr       0 
Δ Equities   –ΔE  +ΔE       0 
Δ MBS         +ΔMBS  –ΔMBS 0 
Δ Inst. inv. 
shares   –ΔSH        +ΔSH 0 
Δ Net worth ΔVw ΔVm ΔVr 0 ΔVf 0 ΔVb 0 ΔVs 0 ΔVI ΔV 
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Table 3. Simulation analysis results – long-run steady state values (source: author’s elaboration) 
Note: The pure capitalist specification excludes rentier wage; the “no debt” specification additionally excludes 
rentier debt. Specification with no relative consumption excludes rentier consumption from the target 
consumption of the middle class. Specification with no securitization excludes the sector of SPVs/underwriters 
and institutional investors. Specification with no middle class also excludes relative consumption effects and 
accounts for securitization of loans to the working class. 
 
 
 
 Full model 
 Pure capitalist 
No relative 
consumption 
No 
securitization 
No 
middle 
class 
 With 
debt 
No 
debt 
Gini index        
Income 0.56  0.54 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.54 
Wealth 0.82  0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.86 
        
Debt-service-to-income ratio        
The working class 5.3%  5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.2% 5.3% 
The middle class 6.9%  6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 7.1% (omitted) 
Rentiers 4.3%  4.3% (omitted) 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 
        
Debt-to-asset ratio        
The working class 63.4%  62.7% 62.4% 63.4% 63.4% 63.4% 
The middle class 33.8%  33.4% 33.0% 33.4% 33.7% (omitted) 
Rentiers 17.9%  17.9% (omitted) 17.9% 18.2% 18.1% 
        
Debt-to-income ratio        
The working class 66.4%  65.9% 65.5% 66.4% 66.9% 67.1% 
The middle class 112.8%  111.8% 111.6% 110.8% 110.6% (omitted) 
Rentiers 142.9%  141.1% (omitted) 142.9% 141.5% 143.4% 
Whole economy 108.2%  101.6% 29.3% 107.8% 106.6% 100.1% 
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Table A1 Exogenous parameter values in the stock-flow consistent model 
Parameter Value Source 
rcb Federal funds rate 0.0025 
Federal Reserve, USA Dec 2008–
Dec 2015  𝛼 Premium on the central bank interest rate 0.03 World Bank, USA 2014 
w0 Parameters in the working 
class and the middle class 
wage rate function 
0.34 
Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015 
w1 0.24 
𝜔w	 Share of non-rentier wage bill paid to working class 
workers 
0.4  
𝜔m	 Share of non-rentier wage bill paid to middle class 
workers 
0.6  
𝜑	 Full capacity capital-output ratio 0.125 Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015 
c1 
Propensity to consume 
out of income of the 
working class 
0.9  
c2 
Propensity to consume 
out of wealth of the 
working class 
0.2  
c3 
Propensity to consume 
out of income of the 
middle class 
0.75  
c4 
Propensity to consume 
out of wealth of the 
middle class 
0.1  
c5 
Propensity to consume 
out of income of the 
rentier class 
0.6  
c6 
Propensity to consume 
out of wealth of the 
rentier class 
0.05  
gpop Population growth rate 0.007 U.S. Census, 2014 
gk Growth rate of capital 0.025  
g𝜆	 Growth rate of labor productivity 0.02  
sf 
Profit retention rate of 
firms 0.32 
Dividend payout ratio for S&P500 
companies, 2014 (Factset) 
β 
Parameter in the loan 
function of the middle 
class and rentiers 
0.1 Setterfield/Kim 2013 
βw 
Parameter in the loan 
function of the working 
class 
0.05  
2 
 
 
x 
Proportion of investment 
financed by equity 
issuance 
0.045 Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015 
λ10= λ20=λ30 
Parameters in the rentier 
portfolio choice equation 
0.3333 
Own calculations based on 
Godley/Lavoie 2005 
λ13= λ23= λ33 0.2222 
λ11= λ21= λ31 0.1111 
λ12= λ22= λ32 0.1111 
λ14= λ24= λ34 0.1111 
λ15= λ25= λ35 0.1111 
η Emulation parameter 0.02  
π0 Parameters in the risk 
premium function 
0.03 Sawyer/Passarella 2015 π1 0.8 
π2 Parameters in the 
mortgage spread equation 
0.1  
π3 0.005  
s0 Parameter in the securitization function 0.6 FRB and SIFMA, USA 2006 
spreadMBS MBS spread 0.0121 Bloomberg, USA 2005-2006 
h0 
Parameter in the house 
rent payments function 0.01  
h1 
Parameter in the middle 
class housing demand 
function 
1.3  
h2 Parameters in the house 
supply function 
0.05  
h3 0.1  
h4	 Parameter in the house price function 0.01  
h0 
Parameter in the house 
rent payments function 0.01  𝜃0	 Parameters in the price of inst. inv. shares function 0.01  𝜃10 Parameters in the price of 
MBS function 
0.3  𝜃11 0.01  
mw 
Parameter in the wage 
premium function 1.6 
Dafermos/Papatheodorou 2015 𝜌 Parameter in the wage premium function 0.3 
h Parameter in the wage premium function 0.2/𝜌 + 0.3 
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Table A2 Initial values for endogenous variables 
Variable Value Additional information 
Nw 
Number of working class 
households 128 US Census Bureau, millions, USA 
2014 Nm Number of middle class households 160 
Nr Number of rentier households 32 
Y Output 17,000 BEA NIPA Data, bn USD, USA 2014 
Capital-output ratio 3 BEA NIPA Data, USA 2014 
URwm 
Unemployment rate for working 
class and middle class workers 0.1  
Mw Value of working class deposits 500  
Mm Value of middle class deposits 1,000  
Mr 
Value of rentier households’ 
deposits 2,000  
Lw Value of loans to the working class 500  
Lm Value of loans to the middle class  1,000  
Lr Value of loans to rentier households 2,000  
E Value of equities outstanding 14,000 Fed Z.1 Tables, bn USD, USA 2014 
Hm Housing demand by the middle class 500  
Hr Housing demand by the rentier class 1,000  
H Housing supply by firms 1,500  
SH Shares of institutional investors 6,600 Fed Z.1 Tables, bn USD, USA 2014 
pe Price of equity 1  
ph Price of housing 1  
pMBS Price of MBS 1  
ps Price of institutional investor shares 1  
Growth rate of the price of equity 0.02  
Growth rate of the price of housing 0.02  
rlm Interest rate on mortgages 0.06 
Freddie Mac Data, 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgage annual average 2000-2008 𝛾 Parameter in the housing rent function 0.3 Zezza 2008 
s	 Share of securitized loans 0.6 FRB and SIFMA, USA 2006 
spreadm	 Spread on mortgage rate 0.03  𝜋 Risk premium 0.03  
 
 
 
 
